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Ulysses: A Mighty Hero in the Fight for 
Freedom of Expression 
Marc J. Randazza, JD, MAMC, LLM 
11 U. MASS L. REV. 268 
ABSTRACT 
James Joyce’s Ulysses was a revolutionary novel, and this much is common 
knowledge. What is not common knowledge is how useful Ulysses was in pushing 
the boundaries of freedom of expression. This masterpiece of literature opened the 
door for modern American free speech jurisprudence, but in recent years has become 
more of an object of judicial scorn. This Article seeks to educate legal scholars as to 
the importance of the novel, and attempts to reverse the anti-intellectual spirit that 
runs through modern American jurisprudence, where the novel is now more used as 
an object of mockery, or as a negative example. 
AUTHOR NOTE 
The author is a free speech lawyer representing dissident journalists, protesters, and 
those who find their artistic expression attacked by the powers that be. A former 
journalist, Randazza has a BA in journalism from the University of Massachusetts, 
and a master’s in journalism from the University of Florida. He earned his Juris 
Doctor degree from Georgetown University, and he also holds an LL.M. in 
international intellectual property law from the Università degli studi di Torino. 
Randazza is admitted to practice law in Arizona, California, Florida, Massachusetts, 
and Nevada; dozens of federal courts; and the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Randazza previously served as a legal commentator for Fox News, and is now a legal 
columnist and commentator for CNN on free speech issues. 
 
The author extends his thanks to Professor John McCourt of Roma Tre University 
for rekindling his interest in Joyce and for giving him the honor of presenting the 
earliest version of this work at the Annual James Joyce School in Trieste, Italy. This 
work is dedicated to Professor McCourt and the 20th Annual Trieste Joyce School. 
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I think this is the most damnable slush and filth that 
ever polluted paper in print. . . . There are no words I 
know to describe, even vaguely, how disgusted I am; 
not with the mire of his effusion but with all those 
whose minds are so putrid that they dare allow such 
muck and sewage of the human mind to besmirch the 
world by repeating it—and in print, through which 
medium it may reach young minds. Oh my God, the 
horror of it. 
      
—Letter to Margaret Anderson1 
 
“[O]ne man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” 
 
—Justice John Marshall Harlan2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
f Ulysses could be personified, its statue would belong on grandiose 
pedestals in prominent squares in American cities. Truly, it belongs 
in the same place that the Marquis de Lafayette stands in American 
history.3 
Lafayette, a foreigner with affection for the cause of liberty in 
America, lent his fortune and name to the cause. Ulysses later joined 
the fight, more as a conscript than a volunteer, to ensure that freedom 
                                                      
 
 
1 PAUL VANDERHAM, JAMES JOYCE AND CENSORSHIP: THE TRIALS OF ULYSSES 1 
(1998) (quoting MARGARET C. ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 212-13 
(Covici, Friede 1930)). 
2 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
3 Marquis de Lafayette was a general who served in both the French Royal Army 
and the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. After 
leaving France in pursuit of contributing to the freedom of the American 
colonies he worked side by side with General George Washington (the later 
president). Lafayette was instrumental in gaining French support for the 
colonials and heightening Washington’s fame. For more information see P.C. 
HEADLEY, THE LIFE OF THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE, MAJOR GENERAL IN THE 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION, (A.L. Burt Co., 
Publishers, N.Y., 1903). 
I 
2016 Ulysses: A Mighty Hero in the Fight 271 
of expression in America truly meant something. Lafayette entered the 
history books a hero, and centuries have not tarnished his noble name. 
Joyce and Ulysses entered on the same footing, but in recent decades, 
their contribution to freedom of expression seems to be fading into the 
dust of history, as courts seem more interested in pointing to Joyce’s 
writing as an example of shoddy literature. While there is room for 
debate on Ulysses’s literary merits and Joyce’s writing style, Ulysses 
has done enough for the cause of liberty to deserve a medal—not the 
judicial scorn that has plagued it in recent decades. To continue the 
metaphor that began this paragraph, if there were statues to Ulysses 
across America, they would very likely be covered in graffiti and 
surrounded by trash, untended by a nation that turned its back on 
knowledge and beauty. 
For decades, much of the American judiciary tended these 
metaphorical monuments to Ulysses. Beginning August 7, 1934, more 
than 300 judges mentioned Ulysses or James Joyce in their opinions. 
These citations—referring directly to the landmark decision United 
States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce,4—are universally 
positive.5 Naturally, since that decision was the one that signaled a 
tectonic shift in American obscenity law, such judicial reverence was 
to be expected—especially because the legal shift was one protecting a 
piece of literary brilliance. 
In the 1980s, the judicial attitude toward Joyce changed: No longer 
the hero of expanding free expression rights, Joyce instead was used as 
an example of bad writing. Cases citing James Joyce’s writings or 
Ulysses directly have a greater tendency to criticize Joyce’s obscure 
writing style—and make it apparent that most judges are not literary 
scholars. Today, a judge is much more likely to mention Joyce to 
                                                      
 
 
4 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
5 See infra Case Table; see e.g., United States v. Head, 317 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 
(E.D. La. 1970); Grove Press v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959); Hanby v. Alaska, 479 P.2d 486, 492 (Alaska 1970); People v. Richmond 
Cnty. News Inc., 179 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958); Burke v. Kingsley 
Books, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735, 740 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955); People v. Vanguard Press, 
Inc., 84 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (Magis. Ct. 1947); People ex rel. Sumner v. Miller, 
279 N.Y.S. 583, 585 (Magis. Ct. 1935). 
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mock another lawyer’s writing than he is to invoke Joyce’s name as a 
case citation or with any degree of reverence.6 
And how sad that is, as it does not seem to be a concerted effort, 
but yet another marker of how the United States truly changed in the 
1980s. Reviewing legal texts is like looking at the striations in a layer 
of rock. Where geologists can point to a line and see an indication of 
an event of mass extinction, we can look at these layers and see an 
intellectual die-off. 
As previously noted, I am not a scholar of great literature. But, as 
Justice Potter Stewart famously stated, “I know it when I see it.”7 I 
was introduced to him in an act of literary conscription. My high 
school teacher unceremoniously dropped Dubliners on our desks and 
insisted that we read it, or we would not pass the class, would not 
graduate, and would then never amount to anything. I resisted, finding 
no interest whatsoever, instead (most ironically) preferring to bury my 
nose into the works of Anthony Burgess. The irony lies in the fact that 
while I might have found Burgess more appealing to my teenage punk-
rock nature, Burgess himself may have been the greatest Joyce fan in 
history.8 He so adored Ulysses that he smuggled a copy in to England, 
                                                      
 
 
6 See infra Case Table; e.g., State Roads Comm’n v. Parker, 344 A.2d 109 (Md. 
1975); Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 
(W.D. Pa. 1981); Conchatta v. Evanko, 83 F. App’x. 437 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Newcom Holdings v. IMBROS Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Virginia 
2005); Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 376 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Eng v. 
Tingen, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5634 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2015); Eve Cuyen 
Butterworth v. 281 St. Nicholas Partners LLC, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3379 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 2014); Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. v. 
Sebelius, 841 F. Supp. 2d 270, 271 (D.D.C. 2012); see also supra Part VII and 
accompanying text. 
7 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (U.S. 1964) (Stewart J, concurring). I have 
reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative 
implication in the Court’s decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments, criminal laws in this area are constitutionally 
limited to hard-core pornography. Id. I shall not today attempt further to define 
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand 
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. Id. But I 
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. Id. 
8 See generally Rosa Mari Bollettieri & Serenella Zanotti, Re Ulysses: A View 
from the Burgess Archives, in OUTSIDE INFLUENCES, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
FRANCA RUGGIERI 37, 37 (Richard Ambrosini et al. eds., 2014). Burgess is, 
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where it was banned at the time, by literally clothing himself in it—
”As a schoolboy I sneaked the two-volume Odyssey Press edition into 
England, cut up into sections and distributed all over my body.”9 That 
is what I call dedication. 
It was not until many years later, while I was working on a fishing 
boat off the coast of Alaska that Joyce took me captive.10 With no 
modern communication on the boat, I was left with two categories of 
reading materials—a collection of 3D pornographic comic books and 
the works of James Joyce. After devouring the comic books, I 
reluctantly picked up Joyce. I did manage to graduate from high school 
without reading Joyce, but at that moment, I regretted having done so. 
II. JOYCE AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 
In Joyce’s words I found the human condition painted on the fabric 
of reality without retouching or any rose-hued tone in those famous 
round glasses. For example, in Giacomo Joyce, he wrote of his 
experience at the opera in Trieste: 
The sodden walls ooze a steamy damp. A symphony of 
smells fuses the mass of huddled human forms: sour 
reek of armpits, nozzled oranges, melting breast 
ointments, mastick water, the breath of suppers of 
sulphurous garlic, foul phosphorescent farts, opoponax, 
the frank sweat of marriageable and married 
womankind, the soapy stink of men.11 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
despite his success, known to have had a serious inferiority complex coupled 
with hero worship when it came to Joyce. 
9 ANTHONY BURGESS, RE JOYCE 83 (W.W. Norton & Co., 2000) (1965) 
(published in England as HERE COMES EVERYBODY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
JAMES JOYCE FOR THE ORDINARY READER). 
10 The author served as a deckhand on F/V Kimberly Ann in 1996. The vessel was 
registered to Anacortes, Washington, but worked mostly out of Alitak, Alaska. 
The author wishes to thank Jon Gattinella for recruiting him to work on the F/V 
Kimberly Ann. 
11   JAMES JOYCE, GIACOMO JOYCE 44 (1968). 
 
274 UMass Law Review v. 11 | 268 
If a reader is looking for a sunnily disposed travelogue or the 
happy tales of times in Italy, the reader should look elsewhere.12 Joyce 
gave us things as they were, and one can see how he could speak to a 
fisherman who picked him up only because the pornographic comic 
books no longer entertained him. We might speculate that this is 
precisely the audience that Joyce would have appreciated. 
III. THE CENSORS AND THE DAWN OF FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Victorian censors who fancied themselves defenders of “the 
culture” or faith did not want Joyce’s version of reality in the 
marketplace of ideas. Joyce may have been radical but the concept of 
book burning was not. Cries for censorship were not rare in “the land 
of the free,”13 despite the inspiring language presented by the First 
Amendment. 
Despite a history of imperfect application of the principles 
enshrined in the First Amendment, Anglo-American jurisprudence has 
drifted in fits and starts toward an ever-expanding view of freedom of 
expression.14 From pre-colonial John Milton15 to post-colonial British 
                                                      
 
 
12 Vapid and vacuous descriptions of Italy are easy to find. For a more saccharine  
 view of the country, see e.g., FRANCES MAYES, UNDER THE TUSCAN SUN: AT  
 HOME IN ITALY (Chronicle Books 1996); ELIZABETH GILBERT, EAT PRAY LOVE 
 (2007). 
13 Early in American history, before the revolution, John Peter Zenger was arrested 
for seditious libel in New York after publishing a newspaper containing articles 
critical of the government. Though Zenger was eventually acquitted—by a jury 
essentially ignoring their instructions—U.S. founders and leaders for a long time 
followed the trend of punishing anyone criticizing the government. The 1798 
Alien and Sedition Acts—though containing a “truth” exception—resulted in the 
convictions of James Callendar (Callendar wrote a book critical of the president, 
calling him a “gross hypocrite”), Mathew Lyon (a congressman who had wrote a 
critical journal article), Benjamin Bache (a newspaper publisher), and many 
others. For an extensive list and description of these suppressive decisions see, 
Gordon T. Belt, Sedition Act of 1798 – a brief history of arrests, indictments, 
mistreatment & abuse, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., http://www.first 
amendmentcenter.org/madison/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/Sedition_Act_ 
cases.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). 
14  U.S. courts are inclined to approve and enlarge protection of political and 
commercial speech yet courts continue to be closeted over erotic speech. 
Compare Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) 
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author John Stuart Mill16 to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Anglo-American philosophy has a history of favoring the 
marketplace of ideas. Justice Holmes was the first to bless this theory 
in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States,17 where he wrote what 
may be the most influential passage in American legal history: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises 
or your power, and want a certain result with all your 
heart, you naturally express your wishes in law, and 
sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by 
speech seems to indicate that you think the speech 
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the 
circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the 
result, or that you doubt either your power or your 
premises. 
But when men have realized that time has upset many 
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more 
than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out. 
That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is 
an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, 
if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
(holding that corporate funding of political advertisements for candidate 
elections is protected under the First Amendment) with United States v. Extreme 
Assoc., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (indictment for producing obscene 
pornography). 
15   See e.g., JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Edward Arber, ed., London, 1869) 
(1644). 
16   See e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Longmans, Green, and Co., 1867); 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (Parker, Son, & Bourn, 
1861). 
17    Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While 
that experiment is part of our system, I think that we 
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check 
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to 
be fraught with death, unless they so imminently 
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and 
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country.18 
With that, Oliver Wendell Holmes opened the clouds and let the 
sun shine in. Strangely enough, this passage was the losing side of a 
debate. The majority opinion sustained the convictions of five men 
who were prosecuted under the Espionage Act of 1917. Their crime 
was that they distributed a series of pamphlets calling for worker 
solidarity in resisting the war effort. 19  The court held that “the 
language of these circulars was obviously intended to provoke and to 
encourage resistance to the United States in the war.”20 In other words, 
core political speech. 
Holmes’s dissent was remarkable in a vacuum, but downright 
shocking in light of his views as the author of majority opinions just 
months prior in which he justified and supported censorship. In 
Schenck v. United States, 21  and Debs v. United States, 22  Holmes 
supported silencing voices of political dissent. However, in the 
intervening months, Holmes reflected upon his position and changed 
his mind, thus changing his own legacy forever.23 This is all the more 
remarkable, in that dissenting opinions carry no legal weight at all. 
Nevertheless, they can occasionally persuade and influence later cases, 
and Holmes’s dissent in Abrams is the greatest example of this 
phenomenon, as his dissent has become the law of the land, unlikely to 
be dislodged. 
                                                      
 
 
18 Id. at 630. 
19 Id. at 624. 
20 Id. 
21 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
22 249 U.S. 211, 215-16 (1919). 
23 See generally THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN 
AMERICA (Metropolitan Books, 2013). 
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Holmes’s dissent in Abrams was the dawn of free expression in the 
United States. Before that, the First Amendment was a forgotten 
amendment, much like the Third Amendment is today. 24  But, on 
November 10, 1919, Holmes gave birth to modern First Amendment 
thought. As a mere single member’s dissent, it was a sickly infant, 
whose likelihood of survival beyond that day was far from likely, 
much less certain. 
Meanwhile, at about the time that the free expression sun was 
rising in America, so was a vicious bora25 of censorship. This desire to 
clamp down on artistic expression grew from the mentality of 
Victorian times, sexual repression, and a bizarre interpretation of 
“morality,” which its adherents pressed in every corner with 
evangelical fervor.26 This mentality has ebbed and flowed over the 
                                                      
 
 
24 The Third Amendment prohibits the government from quartering troops in 
private homes. U.S. Const. amend. III. Aside from a few notable cases, this 
amendment is rarely mentioned in case law, as the issue simply rarely arises in 
modern times. See, e.g., Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 963 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(holding that prison staff had an interest in protecting their property against 
quartering of state National Guardsmen under the Third Amendment); Mitchell 
v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13-cv-01154-APG-CWH, 2015 WL 427835, at *18 
(D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015) (holding that municipal police officers are not “soldiers” 
under the Third Amendment). 
25 The “bora” is a cold, dry, and gusty wind that famously blows through Trieste 
during the winter months. See Wind of the World: Bora-Weather UK, 
WEATHERONLINE, http://www.weatheronline.co.uk/reports/wind/The-Bora.htm 
(last visited April 2, 2016). 
26 While his crusade might seem to be a thing of the past, we can still find his 
intellectual disciples in the relatively recent past. Edwin Meese, U.S. Attorney 
General under Ronald Reagan; John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General under 
George W. Bush; Mary Beth Buchanan, U.S. Attorney for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania from 2001 to 2009; Alberto Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney General 
under George W. Bush in 2005; and Brent Ward, U.S. Attorney for the District 
of Utah from 1981-1988, were all Comstockists with “morality enforcement” at 
the top of their lists of priorities. See Anthony Comstock’s Influence, CASE W. 
RES. UNIV., http://www.case.edu/affil/skuyhistcontraception/online2012/ 
Comstock.html (last visited June 22, 2015); see also Edwin McDowell, Some 
Say Meese Report Rates an ‘X’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1986), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/21/books/some-say-meese-report-rates-an-
x.html (discussing the “Final Report of the Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography,” which concluded there was a “causal relationship” between 
certain kinds of pornography and acts of violence); EDWIN MEESE III, THE 
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT, IN STILL THE LAW OF THE 
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years, but the modern view of expression and the vision of the 
morality censors were set to clash the moment that Ulysses landed in 
the Americas. 
In that clash, the marketplace of ideas itself was the title belt. 
Ulysses was an unwitting contestant in such a bout. Joyce himself did 
not seem to seek the fight out, and he was certainly ill equipped to pay 
for it. At the same time, Joyce was not exactly likely to subscribe to 
laissez-faire principles like the marketplace of ideas.27 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
LAND? 63-78 (Joseph S. McNamara ed. 1987) (“It is this venting of the moral 
concerns of a people that is the very essence of political life. In a popular form 
of government it is not only legitimate but essential that the people have the 
opportunity to give full vent to their moral sentiments.”); Robert D. Richards & 
Clay Calvert, Symposium: Sexually Explicit Speech: Prosecuting Obscenity 
Cases: An Interview With Mary Beth Buchanan, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 56 
(discussing Buchanan’s commitment to prosecuting obscenity cases); Neil A. 
Lewis, A Prosecution Tests the Definition of Obscenity, N.Y. Times (Sep. 28, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html?_r=0 
(discussing six felony obscenity-related charges against Karen Fletcher, brought 
by Mary Beth Buchanan, for operating a Web site called Red Rose, which 
featured detailed fictional accounts of the molesting, torture, and sometimes 
gruesome murders of children under the age of ten, mostly girls); Vicki 
Haddock, Son of a Preacher Man / How John Ashcroft’s Religion Shapes His 
Public Services, SF GATE (Aug. 4, 2002), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/ 
article/Son-of-a-Preacher-Man-How-John-Ashcroft-s-2787948.php (discussing 
how Ashcroft’s religious background influences his policies and service as 
Attorney General); Jake Tapper, Justice Department Targets Porn Industry, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2004), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129480& 
page=1 (“‘Obscenities have always been a priority of the attorney general,’ said 
Mary Beth Buchanan, U.S. attorney for western Pennsylvania. ‘[A]nd [President 
Bush] has asked each U.S. attorney to make that our priority as well.’”); Barton 
Gellman, Recruits Sought for Porn Squad, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/19/AR2005091
901570.html (discussing the FBI’s recruiting for an anti-obscenity squad under 
the Bush Administration, directed by Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, 
who described the initiative as “one of the top priorities”); Max Blumenthal, The 
Porn Plot Against Prosecutors, NATION (Mar. 20, 2007), http://www.the 
nation.com/article/porn-plot-against-prosecutors/ (discussing U.S. Attorney 
Brent Ward’s federal anti-pornography campaign and crusade against 
pornography during the Reagan era, as well as his return to government as the 
chief of the Justice Department’s Obscenity Prosecution Task Force, where his 
main achievement was to prosecute the producer of Girls Gone Wild). 
27 The “marketplace of ideas” is a laissez-faire philosophy suggesting that, over 
time, wherein the competition of ideas and public discourse will result in truth 
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A. Comstock 
The chief American anti-obscenity crusader, Anthony Comstock, 
was born in 1844 to a Congregationalist mother. Comstock followed in 
his mother’s religious footsteps after her death, when Comstock was 
ten, and “rationalized that abstinence from all impure thoughts and 
behaviors secured the faithful path to righteousness.”28 Not only did 
Comstock subject himself to this rationalization, but he also insisted 
on persecuting all others who did not follow this path. He challenged 
tobacco and alcohol use, gambling, and atheism within the military 
during his stretch as a Union soldier in the Civil War and later began 
his attack on the “commercialized sex industry.” 29  The 1873 Act, 
named after Comstock, forbade any distribution or discussion of 
contraceptives. 30  Later the Comstock Act was amended to include 
punishment for producing “obscene, lewd, or lascivious” writings. In 
his final court case, against Margaret Sanger’s Family Limitation, 
Comstock noted, “If some of these women who go around advocating 
Woman Suffrage would go around and advocate women having 
children, they would be rendering society a greater service.” 31 
Comstock ended his personal crusade with a few dedicated followers 
who would later test the bounds of obscenity law against Ulysses. 
The fight to ban Ulysses brought these cultures to a clash—and in 
challenging the Victorian-Comstock censors, Joyce’s supporters, and 
indeed Joyce scholars, lined up on the side of liberty.32 Ulysses is the 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
and effective political representation, though it is not truly connected to any type 
of economic notion. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A 
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984). Joyce was more concerned about a 
stubborn publication of his version of the truth no matter its effect. See generally 
KEVIN BIRMINGHAM, THE MOST DANGEROUS BOOK (2014). 
28 Anthony Comstock’s Influence, supra note 26. 
29 Id. 
30 See generally Robert Corn-Revere, New Age Comstockery, 4 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 173, 175 (1996). 
31 Anthony Comstock’s Influence, supra note 26. 
32 While we review these concepts against the backdrop of Ulysses, the reader will 
likely be incapable of considering the remainder of this Article without 
pondering more modern forms of censorship—be they state sponsored or acts of 
terrorism. On January 7, 2015, Charlie Hebdo cartoonists and employees Jean 
Cabut, Stephane Charbonnier, Philippe Honore, Bernard Verlhac, Georges 
Wolinski, Elsa Cayat, Frederic Boisseau, Bernard Maris, Mustapha Ourrad, 
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point at which Holmes’s theory takes hold beyond a small bit of “core” 
protected speech, and the real promise of the First Amendment truly 
begins to mean something to everyone—not just those engaged in self-
governance, but those who simply wish for a culture free of shackles 
placed upon it by the few, to promote a narrow view of morality. 
B. Ulysses: Obscene? 
Ulysses evokes a “somewhat tragic and very powerful commentary 
on the inner lives of men and women,” and yet has been the subject of 
much disrepute with regard to its depiction of the “way people actually 
spoke and what people actually thought and did during a typical 
day.”33 Ulysses is “obscene” by one inaccurate meaning of the word, 
“that it deals frankly with behavior, habits and actions which in life are 
generally private.”34 One may find it strange that the “typical day” of a 
person could be judged as unfit for the eyes or ears of anyone. In fact, 
if Ulysses is “obscene” then “then life is obscene.”35 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, books like Joyce’s Ulysses were 
deemed obscene. The book was banned in the United States, England, 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
Michel Renaud, as well as two French police officers, were gunned down by 
terrorists in response to satirical publications depicting and criticizing the 
Prophet Muhammad and Islam. Charlie Hebdo Attack: Police Hunt Suspects 
North of Paris, BBC (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
30734762. Later in May 2015, Anata Bijoy Das, a blogger advocating for a 
secular government and rationalism, was attacked and killed in Bangladesh. See 
Marc Randazza, Why You Should Speak Up for Slain Blogger, CNN (May 12, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/12/opinions/randazza-bangladeshi-blogger-
daskilled/index. html. 
33 BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27, at 13. 
34 5 May (1958): Henry Miller to James Laughlin, AM. READER (Apr. 7, 2016), 
http://theamericanreader.com/5-may-1958-henry-miller-to-james-laughlin/; 
Joseph L. Featherstone, Critics Testify for ‘Tropic of Cancer’, HARV. CRIMSON, 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1961/9/27/critics-testify-for-tropic-of-
cancer/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
35 5 May (1958): Henry Miller to James Laughlin, This Day in Lettres, AM. 
READER, http://theamericanreader.com/5-may-1958-henry-miller-to-james-
laughlin/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (describing Henry Moore’s testimony in 
Attorney General v. Book Named “Tropic of Cancer”, 345 Mass. 11 (1962). 
Harry T. Moore testified that Tropic of Cancer’s “seamier passages reflect the 
life of real people. . . . If this book is obscene, then life is obscene.” The same 
can certainly be said for Ulysses, and James Joyce was clearly aware of the 
reflection of real life he had depicted. See BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27. 
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Ireland, Canada, and Australia.36 The U.S. and Ireland lifted their bans 
in 1934, England lifted its in 1936, and Canada retained its ban until 
1949. 37  Nevertheless, Ulysses staged a coup that would result in 
critical changes to obscenity laws in many countries, and the banning 
likely contributed to the book’s popularity.38 
C. Obscenity in the United States: One Book Called Ulysses 
Major developments in United States obscenity law came into play 
just in time to stifle Ulysses. In 1873, Comstock began his Post Office 
vendetta against the consumers of “obscene” literature.39 Comstock 
devoted his life to defending the world from the plague of 
“immorality,” from contraceptives to works of art. In addition to 
Ulysses, Comstock went after all forms of sexual education, nude 
paintings by French modern artists, and even George Bernard Shaw’s 
play Mrs. Warren’s Profession. 40  Ulysses was not getting past the 
morality “crusader” who even expressed disgust at the language used 
by his military peers and the literature read by fellow workers in the 
dry goods store he worked in after the Civil War. Once, Comstock 
even boasted that he had convicted more than 3,000 41  people and 
                                                      
 
 
36 VANDERHAM, supra note 1. 
37 Id. at 5. 
38 See BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27, at 212, 305–06. 
39 Despite the ban and the Post Office’s guidance by Comstock’s reign of literary 
terror, U.S. customs officials often allowed the book through without a fuss. In 
fact, Earnst was almost unable to bring the Ulysses I case because customs failed 
to enforce the ban without excessive persuasion. On the other hand, “in England, 
the Home Office did everything in its power to stop the circulation of Ulysses 
short of a criminal prosecution, which it avoided only because a trial would give 
the book more publicity.” English authorities prevented the book from entering 
the country and tracked down the named recipient to notify them that the book 
was found and confiscated. Even the U.S. Postal Service, save for a few 
Comstockians, was not that motivated. Birmingham, supra note 27, at 305–06, 
262–63. 
40 Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression 
Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society—From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 758 (1992). 
41 “In the forty-one years I have been here I have convicted persons enough to fill 
a passenger train of sixty-one coaches, sixty coaches containing sixty passengers 
each and the sixty-first almost full.” James C.N. Paul & Murray L. Schwartz, 
Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail, HARV. L. REV. 1 (1962). I am not 
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destroyed “160 tons of obscene literature.”42 History has not been kind 
to Comstock, but I would argue that it has not been cruel enough. 
Ulysses was officially banned from the United States on February 
21, 1921, with the convictions of Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap, 
the original U.S. publishers.43 The defense began the debate over what 
“obscenity” and “literary value” meant. 44  It was the first link to 
looking at a potentially obscene literary work as a whole.45 Prior to the 
Ulysses case, obscenity was a piecemeal analysis, leaving the value of 
a work on the sidelines, as censors picked apart the text for 
uncomfortable passages. Naturally, this was only for disfavored works, 
as one could imagine picking apart the Holy Bible, and but for the 
context, there are some pretty racy parts in it.46 
At the time of Ulysses I, “obscene” in the United States meant 
anything “tending to stir the sex impulses or lead to sexually impure 
and lustful thoughts.” 47  This was not exactly American ingenuity. 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
entirely convinced he did that math correctly but would not be surprised if he 
kept a tally. 
42 Id. at 1683. 
43 BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27 at 191–198. 
44 Id. at 304. 
45 See United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (“Ulysses I”), 5 F. Supp. 182, 
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). 
46 “Found in nearly every home within the reach of underage children in a book 
plump with lecherous scenes normally confined to the sin-bins marked ‘Adults 
Only.’” BEN E. AKERLEY, THE X-RATED BIBLE: AN IRREVERENT SURVEY OF 
SEX IN THE SCRIPTURES 7, 216 (1999). Examples include: “And it came to pass 
on the morrow, that the firstborn said unto the younger, behold, I lay yesternight 
with my father: let us make him drink wine this night also; and go thou in, and 
lie with him, that we may preserve seed of our father.” Genesis 19:30–36 
(referring to the story of Lot’s two daughters getting him drunk, sleeping with 
him, and later bearing his children); and “My beloved put his hand by the hole 
of the door, and my bowels were moved for him. Thy statute is like a palm tree, 
and thy breasts are clusters of grapes.” SONG OF SOLOMON 5:4, 7:6-9 (relaying 
the story of their intercourse, Solomon’s—notably black—wife describes 
Solomon’s obsession with her breasts). 
47 Id. Again, this could mean even the Bible, but given that the censors usually 
derived their moral authority from it, the Bible seemed to be exempt. And 
granted its broad coverage, obscenity law, even at the time, could have alluded 
to much more. For instance, in Canada, obscenity law covered general 
obscenity, not simply sexual aberrance. The early 1892 obscenity statute in 
Canada “made it an offence to offer for sale ‘any obscene book, or other printed 
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With a relatively young judiciary and a common law tradition, 
Americans simply imported the logic from the 1868 U.K. case Regina 
v. Hicklin.48 The Hicklin test for obscenity was “whether the tendency 
of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those 
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose 
hands a publication of this sort may fall.”49 It focused on the effect the 
allegedly obscene article had on the most corruptible readers and not 
on the book’s actual contents. A judge merely had to imagine a 
hypothetical scenario where someone (unlike himself, of course) could 
be corrupted by the work. Despite this test, Morris Ernst, the U.S. 
attorney who defended Ulysses, challenged the court to determine that 
a book could corrupt innocent minds.50 
Judge Woolsey, in Ulysses I, did not only accept Ernst’s argument 
that a book could not corrupt the minds of most readers, but also took 
the first major step away from the Hicklin rule. At the outset of the 
opinion, Woolsey stated that the book is not simple to read nor 
understand, and a “jury trial would have been an extremely 
unsatisfactory, if not an almost impossible method of dealing with 
it.”51 He pointed out that Joyce’s writing depicts the day of lower 
middle class citizens of Dublin, detailing what they do, say, think, and 
imagine. The Hicklin standard is easily read to conclude that many of 
the things Joyce details in the normal lives of people could be deemed 
obscene. Woolsey held that because the book looked at everyday lives, 
there could not truly be anything bannable because people commonly 
experience, or at least poor Dubliners experienced, the events Ulysses 
detailed.52 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
or written matter, or any picture, photograph, model or other object, tending to 
corrupt morals,’” but declined to provide a precise definition of obscenity. See 
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1982, c 163; L.W. SUMNER, THE HATEFUL AND 
THE OBSCENE: STUDIES IN THE LIMITS OF FREE EXPRESSION 12 (Toronto 2004). 
Thus, it is understandable that Canada would be the last country to release the 
ban of Ulysses if it applied the statutory definition of obscenity including 
anything “disgusting or repugnant.” 
48 Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 2 Q.B. 360 (1868). 
49 Id. at 369. 
50 BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27, at 168–70. 
51 United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (“Ulysses I”), 5 F. Supp. 182, 183 
(S.D.N.Y. 1933). 
52 Id. 
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Woolsey also made the unusual comment for the time that those 
who do not like allegedly obscene content can simply look away.53 
This idea contradicts the Hicklin rule, as well as many of the obscenity 
tests following it. Woolsey felt that simply “turning away” is an 
appropriate option. But, even modern obscenity law does not take this 
position.54 Woolsey also added that the book in question must be read 
and assessed for obscenity in its entirety. The opinion grants this 
assessment casually and seems to limit it to only books; “in its 
entirety, as a book must be [read].” 55  Thus, either Woolsey truly 
thought that books deserved a reading of the whole text, or he found a 
large loophole through which to bring many “obscene” books. 
Upon appeal, in Ulysses II,56 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
not only upheld Woolsey’s decision, but also laid the foundation for 
the now-prevailing (in the United States) Miller standard and distanced 
American law from Hicklin. Indeed, as the dissent suggested, the court 
did not make an effort to uphold Hicklin at all.57 The appellate court 
broadened Woolsey’s logic and paved the way for new analysis, 
stating: 
[I]t is settled, at least so far as this court is concerned, 
that works of physiology, medicine, science, and sex 
instruction are not within the statute, though to some 
extent and among some persons they may tend to 
promote lustful thoughts. We think the same immunity 
should apply to literature as to science, where the 
presentation, when viewed objectively, is sincere, and 
                                                      
 
 
53 See id. at 184. “If one does not wish to associate with such folk as Joyce 
describes, that is one’s own choice. In order to avoid indirect contact with them 
one may not wish to read ‘Ulysses,’ that is quite understandable.” Id. 
54 After being arrested and prosecuted for distribution and production of obscenity, 
Robert Ziccari said “The funny thing about my business is I don’t force it on 
anybody. The only people that are going to be forced to watch my movies are 
the 12 people that sit on that jury.” Jake Tapper, Justice Department Targets 
Porn Industry, ABC (Aug. 28, 2003), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id 
=129480. 
55 One Book Called “Ulysses”, 5 F. Supp. at 185. 
56 United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 706 (2d Cir. 1934) 
(“Ulysses II”). 
57 72 F.2d at 709 (Manton, J., dissenting). 
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the erotic matter is not introduced to promote lust and 
does not furnish the dominant note of the publication.58 
This four-tiered analysis was not necessary to rule Ulysses non-
obscene. Woolsey had already established that Ulysses was an 
inaccessible work about ordinary lives. Yet the Second Circuit found it 
necessary to further develop an exception for literary works. The way 
the court phrased its reasoning for a literary exception highlights how 
impossible it is to apply obscenity law with any consistency. An 
average person may be sexually aroused by any number of factors, 
including by a scientific text, as the court reasoned.59 
The dissent in Ulysses II argued that “the object of the use of the 
obscene words was not a subject for consideration,” meaning that the 
book as a whole is divorced from the effect a given passage has on its 
readers.60 Under the Hicklin test, the whole of Ulysses being about the 
lives of Dubliners would not matter if merely one section evoked 
lustful thoughts. 
D. Roth v. United States 
Even after Ulysses, Hicklin remained partially intact. But the 
reasoning from Ulysses I & II entered the jurisprudential DNA and 
started to make subtle changes. Following Ulysses, Roth v. United 
States61 took the lead as a key obscenity case. That case involved two 
persons convicted for selling obscene books. The Court again held that 
the First Amendment did not protect obscene speech on the rationale 
that the Constitution was intended to “assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.”62 The Roth court saw these “political and social changes” 
to be separate from changes in acceptance of sexual material. The 
Court reasoned that this was never going to be a change civilized 
society would desire.63 There seemed to be a judicial position that 
                                                      
 
 
58 Id. at 707 (internal citation omitted). 
59 Id. at 706-07. 
60 Id. at 709. 
61 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
62 Id. at 484. 
63 Id. 
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Victorian sexual mores were there to stay, and no amount of 
discussion would change that. 
Despite Hicklin’s continued influence, the Court noted that “all 
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the 
prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the 
guaranties [of the First Amendment].”64 “But implicit in the history of 
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without 
redeeming social importance.” 65  The question then becomes: If 
obscenity cannot have redeeming social importance, then are all things 
with redeeming social importance not obscene? Or if obscene things 
contain any social importance, does the social importance become 
moot upon it being held obscene? In light of Ulysses, one would think 
the former view would prevail—and this concept is the key to the gift 
to freedom of expression that the Ulysses cases represent. 
Though the Roth court followed Hicklin, it criticized the Hicklin 
test for its potential to stifle protected speech about sex. This criticism 
hints that literature should be excluded in some cases as some material, 
though sexual, is sufficiently interesting to the marketplace of ideas to 
warrant protection. 66  To uphold these standards, voiced earlier in 
Ulysses II, the court created a new test. Roth modified the obscenity 
test to ask “whether to the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole appeals to prurient interest.”67 The impact of the potentially 
obscene material was measured against the present-day standards of 
the “[a]verage person in the community” that the material was likely to 
reach.68 Here, the Court followed the Ulysses I reasoning that not only 
will there be people not wanting to access the work at issue, but those 
who access it may not even understand it, let alone be offended by it.69 
                                                      
 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 489. 
67 Id. 
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69 Cf. United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (“Ulysses I”), 5 F. Supp. 182, 
184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). Ulysses is a work that stresses incapacity for 
understanding. If a child were likely to access the book they would not 
understand what it contained. Similarly, for an obscene mailing, a child who 
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Since this standard is so malleable, the defendants in Roth argued 
that it did not provide a reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt or 
predictability. The court dismissed this argument, stating that “the 
thrust of the argument is that these words are not sufficiently precise 
because they do not mean the same thing to all people, all the time 
everywhere,” while determining that the test “conveys sufficiently 
definite warning.”70 
Justices Douglas and Black dissented in Roth, noting that 
convictions based on “purity of thought which a book or tract instills 
in the mind of the reader” were unfaithful to the meaning of the First 
Amendment, especially since sexual thoughts are a daily occurrence.71 
The dissent cited a research questionnaire that asked college-age 
women what “things were most stimulating sexually.” Answers varied 
from dancing to theater to men in general. 72  Clearly, the dissent 
pointed out, the test based on a community standard is “community 
censorship in one of its worst forms.”73 
Indeed, even Justice Harlan’s concurrence questioned the extent of 
obscenity restrictions. Citing Ulysses II, Harlan noted that the question 
of the case only involved the constitutionality of the statute and not the 
“correctness of the definition of ‘obscenity.’”74 He noted that though a 
jury could easily find a book like Ulysses obscene, the conviction of 
someone for selling it would raise “the gravest constitutional 
problems.” 75  The court must make independent judgments when 
determining obscenity, which can often cause material with 
“redeeming social importance” to fall outside the First Amendment’s 
protection.76 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
would not normally access the mailing likely would not understand the mailing 
upon receipt. 
70 Roth, 354 U.S. at 491. 
71 Id. at 508. 
72 Id. at 509. 
73 Id. at 512. Despite this language, the dissent still argues that “no one would 
suggest that the First Amendment permits nudity in public places, adultery, and 
other phases of sexual misconduct.” Id. 
74 Roth, 354 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
75 Id. at 498. 
76 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, J., concurring). 
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Later, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, the Supreme Court attempted to 
reconcile the concerns over a community standards test.77 As we saw 
in Ulysses I & II, such standards are difficult to establish when 
assessing access, understanding, and degree of offensiveness. 
Jacobellis dealt with convictions for possession and showing of 
obscene films. The court found that the movie, a French love story, 
was not obscene and that the test’s “contemporary community 
standards” must be interpreted as the standards of society as a whole, 
rather than a local community.78  A test relying on local standards 
would cause distributors to be wary about selling anything that could 
be remotely thought of as obscene, for fear of conviction in an 
especially conservative community. 
Again, the Jacobellis dissent sounded the same worries of the 
dissent in Ulysses II. The government seeks “to maintain a decent 
society and, on the other hand, the right of individuals to express 
themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments,” and so the dissent argued that the phrase 
“community standards” should mean “community,” not national, 
standards.79 Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, pointed out the nigh-
unworkable vagaries of the Roth obscenity standard and famously 
stated that while he could not develop a concise definition of the term 
hard-core pornography, “I know it when I see it.”80 
In a related case, A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts, the Court sought to clarify this 
“redeeming social importance” standard. 81  In Memoirs, the Court 
clarified that, to be deemed obscene, a book must be “utterly without 
redeeming social value.”82 This was in opposition to the lower court’s 
ruling that “some minimal literary value does not mean it is of any 
social importance.”83 
                                                      
 
 
77 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
78 Id. at 193. 
79 Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 199 (Warren, J., dissenting). 
80 Id. at 197. 
81 See A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 415 (1966). 
82 Id. at 419. 
83 Id. (quoting Attorney General v. Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure”, 206 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Mass. 1965). 
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Again, in Memoirs, the Supreme Court upheld the Ulysses II dicta 
that literary work should be granted similar immunity as scientific 
materials. In Ulysses I, Woolsey did not attempt to impress upon his 
audience that Ulysses maintained literary importance and social value 
to all persons or even all possible readers. Yet, the social importance 
of Joyce’s work—or of John Cleland’s works—to a few well-read 
scholars is not a moot point, as dissenters would have you believe. 
E. Stanley v. Georgia and Restricting Private Possession 
The very slow move away from the Hicklin test continued in the 
1969 case Stanley v. Georgia, where the Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment protected the private possession of obscene 
materials.84 Indeed, if this were the law during the time of the Ulysses 
trial, readers may have been saved. Perhaps a major purpose of one 
deciding to read an “obscene” book is the secrecy and taboo-ness of 
the matter—or simply because it challenges societal norms. With the 
Postal Service strictly limiting access to Ulysses, reading it was a 
challenge to be overcome—a forbidden fruit that was all the sweeter. 
Without such a challenge Ulysses may not have gained such extensive 
popularity.85 
Stanley dealt with obscene films discovered during a search of the 
defendant’s home for unrelated crimes. The Court seemed inclined to 
address the First Amendment questions the case posed, though the 
Court could have simply disposed of the case on the basis that the 
government conducted an unconstitutional search and seizure.86 The 
government argued, “If the State can protect the body of a citizen, may 
it not . . . protect his mind?”87 The Court rejected this by finding a 
fundamental right almost separate from the right of free speech in the 
“right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social 
                                                      
 
 
84 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
85 The U.S. could have been quieter about its legal recourse against Ulysses, but 
this does not mean that Ulysses would have been any less popular. Essentially 
the only way for U.S. postal agents to make Ulysses less of a problem would 
have been to not ban it in the first place. 
86 See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 569 (1969). And again, how do you protect men’s 
minds from their own lives? See supra text accompanying note 32. 
87 Id. at 560. 
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worth.” 88  Certainly after Ulysses, the government cannot begin to 
think they can “control men’s minds.” Again, as in the Ulysses cases, 
dissenters assume that the understanding is the same in all men’s 
minds. At least the judges in Stanley learned somewhere in the time 
since Ulysses that an “obscene” work may breed thoughts as far from 
lustful as possible—sadness, contempt, anger, and the many other 
feelings expressed by Ulysses readership over the years. The Stanley 
court reconciled this issue by clarifying that the First Amendment 
protects the right to speak as well as the right to receive speech.89 
The Court stated, “Whatever may be the justifications for other 
statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the 
privacy of one’s own home.” 90  This raises the question, then, of 
whether there are grounds for regulating certain kinds of obscene 
speech, but not others. After all, “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage 
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s 
minds.”91 The irony in the Stanley court’s pro-speech proclamations, 
of course, is that the entire concept of obscenity law aims to control 
men’s minds, especially under the original Hicklin standard. One 
justification for such control is that “exposure to obscene materials 
may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crime of sexual violence.”92 
Showing a development in judicial thought diverging from puritanical 
roots, the Stanley court noted that there is little evidence of a causal 
connection between crime and obscene materials 93 —yet again 
reaffirming the thought process of Judge Woolsey and fellow Ulysses 
readers. 
Though Stanley attempted to make a large leap away from obscene 
speech restrictions—and to confirm Ulysses’ logic in the Supreme 
Court arena—multiple cases following the decision have softened 
                                                      
 
 
88 Id. at 564. 
89 See id. Note that Stanley does not refer to Ulysses, but its argument is backed by 
the dissent and concurrence in Roth, which relies on the precedent set by 
Ulysses. 
90 Id. at 565. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 566. 
93 Id. This same argument and rebuttal is consistently applied in debates 
concerning the sale of violent video games, particularly when minors are 
involved. 
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Stanley’s blow to obscenity jurisprudence. For example, in Paris Adult 
Theatre v. Slanton, the Supreme Court restricted the showing of 
obscene films to consenting adults in private theaters94—thus again 
reaffirming that obscenity law is in anticipation of the exact effect on 
“men’s minds,” here especially on those who may not have known 
what they were truly getting into.95 The appellant’s theater had posted 
signs noting that the films screened contained nudity, and minors were 
refused entry. 96  The Court insisted that in addition to protecting 
minors, restrictions on obscene articles was necessary to “[stem] the 
tide of commercialized obscenity” and to maintain the quality of life of 
the community because such material may risk public safety and 
increase crime. People have some freedom of choice in the materials 
they view, the Court reasoned, but the government must have a way to 
protect the “gullible from the exercise of their own volition.”97 Paris 
holds that preventing obscene speech from entering the hands of 
willing participants is an appropriate way to achieve these goals. But it 
is an idiotic and disgraceful decision and a slap in the face of Ulysses 
precedent. 
In another case, Osborne v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Stanley did not apply when dealing with statutes restricting possession 
of child pornography. 98  Child pornography is probably when 
censorship is most permissible, but even in these circumstances the 
dissenting justices in Osborne were willing to uphold the individual 
right to possess pornography by applying the overbreadth doctrine.99 
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In the dissent’s view “the state [child pornography] law, even as 
construed authoritatively by the Ohio Supreme Court, is still fatally 
overbroad, and our decision in Stanley . . . prevents the State from 
criminalizing appellant’s possession.”100 Justice Brennan here was not 
advocating for child pornography, but rather was again pointing out 
the fact that most obscenity laws cover protected speech and are thus 
unconstitutional. 
In light of this precedent we have seen the U.S. Supreme Court 
swing back and forth in their respect for free expression when sexual 
content is in play. At the core of these case holdings the Court is 
inclined to favor Ulysses I & II but knows it runs the potential risk of 
upsetting a society not yet prepared to handle the bowel movements of 
Leopold Bloom, let alone the right of someone to make fictional 
stories about child abusers.101 
IV. MILLER V. CALIFORNIA: OBSCENITY TEST TODAY 
The controlling legal standard for determining obscenity in the 
United States today, the Miller test, finally codified the literary 
exception proposed in Ulysses II. The case of Miller v. California102 
dealt with mass mailings advertising “adult material” being considered 
obscene. 
The unsolicited mailings prominently showed explicit nude 
drawings. Specifically, the Court noted that the States have a 
significant interest in regulating such unsolicited mailings where “the 
mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending 
the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.”103 
This reasoning is similar to the government’s basis for convicting 
Anderson and Heap more than half a century earlier, which again has 
been highly unconvincing since that conviction.104 The Court proposed 
a new test for obscenity, where a finding of obscenity is determined 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional 
unless its overbreadth is not only real but substantial.” 
100 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 126 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
101 See infra note 106 (discussing the case of Karen Fletcher). 
102 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1973). 
103 Id. at 19. 
104 BIRMINGHAM, supra note 27, at 192. 
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by: 1) whether the average person applying contemporary community 
standards (not national standards)105 would find that the work as a 
whole appeals to the prurient interest; 2) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct defined by 
applicable state law; and 3) whether the work lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.106 
The Miller test reaffirms and clarifies Roth, and overturns the 
national standard rationale of Jacobellis and the “utterly without 
socially redeeming value” standard in Memoirs. Most importantly, it 
memorializes the importance of literary works acknowledged in 
Ulysses II, where the court valiantly, unapologetically, and for the first 
time, equated the importance of the literary mind with the importance 
of scientific discovery and explanation. 
V. CRITICISM BY THE LAITY 
Vagueness, though a common criticism of most obscenity tests 
including Miller, was not an issue in the case of Ulysses, as Joyce 
himself and his publishers were well aware that the book was likely to 
                                                      
 
 
105 There have been other standards suggested in the United States and one even 
introduced in Canada. As early as 1987, Canadian courts considered readership 
in the assessment of the audience for allegedly obscene material. The Canadian 
Supreme Court has also suggested “restrictions on expressive freedom must be 
harm-based rather than morality-based.” Though such standards may not pose 
the exact problems of the “community standard,” they continue to lack clarity 
and “there is no good reason to think that the community’s level of tolerance 
accurately tracks harmfulness.” SUMNER, supra note 47, at 125. 
106 This standard is certainly better than the Hicklin test, but the literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value, though seemingly broad, is unpredictable as 
applied. For example, in 2008 Karen Fletcher was prosecuted and later plead 
guilty to six counts of distributing obscene materials online. Fletcher had posted 
fictional stories on her website containing graphic descriptions of torture and 
molestation of children. United States v. Fletcher, No. CR 06-329 (D. Penn. 
2008). Despite the fact that U.S. courts usually refrain from finding obscenity in 
text-only cases, Fletcher’s case was a prime opportunity for “obscenity” 
opponents to obtain a conviction based on text alone. Fletcher’s agoraphobia 
was a driving force behind her guilty pleading in lieu of trial. Paula Reed Ward, 
Afraid of Public Trial, Author to Plead Guilty in Online Obscenity Case, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, (May 17, 2008), http://www.post-gazette.com/ 
frontpage/2008/05/17/Afraid-of-public-trial-author-to-plead-guilty-in-online-
obscenity-case/stories/200805170216. 
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be banned under existing law—yet they chose to challenge it 
nonetheless. Ernst’s victory was likely due to some combination of the 
right judge, the right time, and general apathy regarding obscenity, 
aside from those who vehemently believed anything with sexual 
content was filth.  
Decades after Anderson and Heap, Ulysses finally succeeded in 
bringing about a sunrise in the struggle for a preferred position for 
literature under U.S. obscenity law. 
Nevertheless, without the literary exception, Ulysses and similar 
works can, even under Miller, find themselves swallowed up by the 
broad obscenity rules. As dissenters opined many times, without 
making Holmes-level traction, “what causes one person to boil up in 
rage over one pamphlet or movie may reflect only his neurosis, not 
shared by others.”107 Yet even opinions in favor of lowered obscenity 
restrictions indicate that judges often believe there is some type of 
undefined obscene thing that society will never accept even in light of 
changing social standards. For example, the Miller opinion states: 
One can concede that the ‘sexual revolution’ of recent 
years may have had useful byproducts in striking layers 
of prudery from a subject long irrationally kept from 
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that no 
regulation of patently offensive ‘hard core’ materials is 
needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow 
unregulated access to heroin because it is a derivative 
of medicinal morphine.108 
Ulysses is a perfect example of the schizophrenic and erotophobic 
nature of American attitudes toward obscenity. Back in the 1930s 
when Ulysses I & II were decided, many citizens and judges would 
think that “civilized” people do not allow unregulated access to 
Joyce’s “filthy” literature. Yet today, most readers would be hard-
pressed to find shock in their hearts at a description of urination 109 or 
the clever insult “mean bloody scut.”110 As Charles McGrath recently 
put it: 
                                                      
 
 
107 Miller, 413 U.S. at 41. 
108 Id. at 36. 
109 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 46 (1918). 
110 Id. at 326. 
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By the standards of today’s dirty books, Ulysses seems 
pretty tame, and it’s hard to put yourself back in the 
mind-set of those who took such strenuous offense in 
the ‘20s, when the book was first published by the 
heroic Sylvia Beach.111 
Of course, some might not make it to the end to evaluate the work 
as a whole. Even the most dedicated Joycean must admit that there is a 
significant number of people who simply despise the work. In fact, 
even Ezra Pound disapproved: 
I think certain things simply bad writing, in this section. 
Bad because you waste the violence. You use a stronger 
word than you need, and this is bad art, just as any 
needless superlative is bad art.112 
The relative merit of Ulysses or lack thereof, however, is of no 
centrality to this study. Is Joyce a genius, or is his writing just so many 
more stools dropped by Leopold Bloom in exacting detail, as was 
further criticized by Pound?113 If anyone thinks that Ulysses is his 
bawdiest work, his private letters to Nora Barnacle truly reveal him in 
all his glory. 
My sweet little whorish Nora I did as you told me, you 
dirty little girl, and pulled myself off twice when I read 
your letter. I am delighted to see that you do like being 
fucked arseways. Yes, now I can remember that night 
when I fucked you for so long backwards. It was the 
dirtiest fucking I ever gave you, darling. My prick was 
                                                      
 
 
111 Charles McGrath, How Would ’Ulysses’ Be Received Today?, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/books/review/how-would-
ulysses-be-received-today.html. 
112 Letter from Ezra Pound to James Joyce (Mar. 29, 1918), http://www.the 
parisreview.org/blog/2015/06/16/down-where-the-asparagus-grows. (The letter 
also states: “If we are suppressed too often we’ll be suppressed finally and for 
all, to the damn’d stoppage of all our stipends. AND I can’t have our august 
editress jailed, NOT at any rate for a passage which I do not think written with 
utter maestria.”). 
113 “The contrast between Blooms interior poetry and his outward surroundings is 
excellent, but it will come up without such detailed treatment of the dropping 
feces.” See id. 
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stuck in you for hours, fucking in and out under your 
upturned rump.114 
I question whether many of us would set Joyce up with our sisters, 
but this is definitely a man that I would like to drink whiskey with. 
If the reader has a problem with that, the reader is free to cast this 
Article to the ground, or line his bird cage with it, burn it, or wipe his 
ass with it. But, the reader has no liberty to force anyone else to read it. 
As the Miller court recognized, “there is no ‘captive audience’ 
problem.”115 One is never forced to read Joyce. In fact, as recounted 
earlier, someone tried to force the author with threats of a lifetime of 
utter failure if he demurred. Obviously this was neither successful in 
forcing the author to read it nor a prescient prediction. 
If one could be forced to read Joyce, what would be the greater 
sin? Forcing someone to read it, think about it, and consider its relative 
merits, or depriving a hungry mind of the opportunity to do so? The 
marketplace of ideas would suggest that a forced reading is of greater 
value than no read at all. And, given that the marketplace of ideas 
seems to continue to demand access to Joyce, those who wished to 
keep it from the hands and minds of the willing have no intellectual 
capital to spend there. 
VI. THE JUDICIARY’S SHIFTING VIEW OF JOYCE 
When one discusses the marketplace of ideas, one must be 
prepared to find one’s own wares rejected. One measure of the work is 
to review how it is mentioned in legal citations. 
Almost immediately after the 1934 Ulysses II landmark case, the 
judiciary seemed to embrace Joyce and Ulysses alike. Case after case 
mentioned the decision. Then in 1975, one case became the first to 
mention Joyce not in the context of obscenity law, but as an example 
of bad writing.116 “Although the appellant in its brief, by arbitrarily 
packaged passages reminiscent of the chapters in James Joyce’s 
“Ulysses” recites in great factual detail a jury-type argument.” It 
would not be until 1981 when such derision made its way into a 
                                                      
 
 
114 Letter from James Joyce to Nora Barnacle (1909), http://loveletters. 
tribe.net/thread/fce72385-b146-4bf2-9d2e-0dfa6ac7142d. 
115 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1973). 
116 State Roads Comm’n v. Parker, 344 A.2d 109, 119 (Md. 1975). 
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decision again, but the next time it would be even harsher. Brunwasser 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.117 truly opened up on Joyce in an even 
more indicting manner. 
Allen N. Brunwasser’s pleadings contain a good bit of 
this, and we are never certain whether we are reading 
an attempted assertion of a legal claim, or some side 
remark that popped into Brunwasser’s mind at the time. 
But more than that, Brunwasser’s pleadings and briefs 
reflect principally the style of the stream of 
consciousness school, so popular in that generation. 
We were able to understand dimly the action in 
“Ulysses,” today it is explained by shelves of guides, 
commentaries, companions and concordances. As 
Joyce grew older he became more difficult and nobody 
understood “Finnegan’s Wake” until the guides and 
commentaries began to appear. No one supplies us with 
guides to Brunwasser’s pleadings. 
From that point forward, the prevailing judicial wind was to use 
Joyce as an example of how not to write a brief or a law. In the 2012 
case Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa, Corp. v. Sebelius, 118  Judge 
Lamberth characterized the U.S. Medicare law as akin to “a law 
written by James Joyce and edited by E.E. Cummings.” Such judicial 
hyperbolic license is not itself troubling, but it is as if historians started 
to mock Lafayette for speaking English with a French accent or for his 
eating habits. Even worse, it would be as if historians not only focused 
on the superficial elements of Lafayette’s personality, but did so while 
ignoring his contributions to American independence. 
With that, let us look at a limited overview of some cases 
mentioning Joyce. As the reader can see, they begin with respect for 
the decision, but as time goes on, the superficiality of judicial views on 
Joyce becomes the prevailing view.  
1935 
People v. Miller, 
155 Misc. 446 
(D. N.Y. 1935) 
Holding that a book was 
not obscene, the court cites 
to Ulysses I & II to clarify 
that obscenity statues are 
Citing 
                                                      
 
 
117 518 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (W.D. Pa. 1981). 
118 841 F. Supp. 2d 270, 271 (D.D.C. 2012). 
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not meant to suppress 
literary works. 
1938 
People v. 
Larsen, 5 
N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. 
1938) 
Cases like Ulysses note a 
change in popular attitudes 
and a move for the law to 
“avoid interference with 
justifiable freedom of 
expression.” 
Citing 
1940 
United States v. 
Rebhuhn, 109 
F.2d 512 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1940) 
Uses Ulysses to say that 
some sexual material may 
not be obscene per se 
because some people may 
wish “seriously to study the 
sexual practices.” 
Citing 
1944 
People v. Dial 
Press, 182 Misc. 
416 (N.Y. 1944) 
Found book to be obscene 
with use of Ulysses test. Citing 
1944 
Stall v. State, 
182 Misc. 416 
(N.Y. 1944) 
Found book to be obscene 
with use of Ulysses test. Citing 
1947 
People v. 
Vanguard Press, 
192 Misc. 127 
(N.Y. 1947) 
Quoting Ulysses “nowhere 
does it tend to be an 
aphrodisiac” with regard to 
another non-obscene work. 
Citing 
1949 
Commonwealth 
v. Gordon, 1949 
Pa. Dist. & 
Cnty. Dec. 
LEXIS 242, *3-
4 (Pa. C.P. 
1949) 
“It should be noted at once 
that the wording of section 
524 requires consideration 
of the indicted material as a 
whole; it does not proscribe 
articles or publications that 
merely contain obscene 
matter. . . . United States v. 
Ulysses, 72 F.(2d) 705 
(1934).” 
Citing 
1952 
State v. Scope, 7 
Terry 519 
(Delaware 1952) 
Uses Ulysses I standard for 
assessment as a whole. Citing 
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1953 
New American 
Library of 
World 
Literature, Inc. 
v. Allen, 114 F. 
Supp. 823, 830 
(D. Ohio 1953) 
The Ulysses case has been 
recognized as the keystone 
of the modern American 
rule that indictable 
obscenity must be “dirt for 
dirt’s sake.” 
Citing 
1953 
Bantam Books 
v. Melko, 25 
N.J.Super. 292 
(N.J. Chancery 
1953) 
Ulysses was banned under 
unpredictable authority that 
would pick and choose 
which potentially obscene 
literature to let in versus 
which to ban. 
Citing 
1955 
Burke v. 
Kingsley Books, 
208 Misc. 150 
(N.Y. 1955) 
Citing Ulysses to determine 
that despite criticism of the 
obscenity test a book 
constituted dirt for dirt’s 
sake. 
Citing 
1958 
People v. 
Richmond 
County News, 
13 Misc.2d 1068 
(N.Y. 1958) 
Ulysses test for “dominant 
theme” of the work. Found 
magazine obscene. 
Citing 
1959 
Grove Press v. 
Christenberry, 
175 F. Supp 488 
(S.D. N.Y. 
1959) 
“The essence of the 
Ulysses holding is that a 
work of literary merit is not 
obscene under federal law 
merely because it contains 
passages and language 
dealing with sex in a most 
candid and realistic fashion 
and uses many four-letter 
Anglo-Saxon words. Where 
a book is written with 
honesty and seriousness of 
purpose, and the portions 
which might be considered 
obscene are relevant to the 
theme, it is not condemned 
by the statute even though 
it justly may offend many.” 
Citing 
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1970 
United States v. 
Head, 317 F. 
Supp. 1138, 
1142 (E.D. La. 
1970) 
Using the test from the 
Ulysses cases (a book must 
be read in its entirety to 
determine obscenity) to 
find that an underground 
newspaper was not 
obscene. 
Citing 
1971 
Sullivan v. 
Houston 
Independent 
School Dist., 
333 F. Supp 
1149 (S.D. Tx. 
1971) 
Ulysses requires a 
publication to be read as a 
whole, and it does not 
matter whether certain 
portions are obscene even 
in the context of student 
made materials distributed 
in school. 
Citing 
1973 
Bazaar v. 
Fortune, 476 
F.2d 570 (5th 
Cir. 1973) 
The Court found that a 
student magazine could not 
be censored because it used 
vulgar language. The court 
used the fact that Ulysses 
was required reading for 
some of the college classes 
(which contains all of the 
“four-letter words” used in 
the magazine) and stated 
that Ulysses was a 
“recognized literary 
masterpiece,” but also 
distinguished the student 
magazine in that the court 
was not required to 
determine if “this author 
[had] as much literary merit 
as a novel by James Joyce.” 
Citing 
1975 
State Roads 
Comm’n v. 
Parker, 275 Md. 
651 (Maryland 
App. 1975) 
“Although the appellant in 
its brief, by arbitrarily 
packaged passages 
reminiscent of the chapters 
in James Joyce’s “Ulysses” 
recites in great factual 
detail a jury-type 
Critical 
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argument.” 
1976 
Bloom v. 
Municipal 
Court, 16 Cal.3d 
71 (Cal. 1976) 
Ulysses as an example of a 
protected “soporific” work, 
finding a state obscenity 
law overbroad. 
Citing 
1980 
Penthouse 
International, 
Ltd. v. 
McAuliffe, 610 
F.2d 1353, 1367 
(5th Cir. Ga. 
1980)  
“[The Hicklin] test was 
adopted by some American 
courts but later decisions 
have rejected it. United 
States v. One Book Entitled 
Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d 
Cir. 1934) (rejected test 
when government 
attempted to prevent 
circulation of James 
Joyce’s Ulysses in the 
United States). In Ulysses, 
Judge Augustus Hand 
found some parts of the 
book to be obscene but 
stated that it was not 
obscene when ‘taken as a 
whole.’ The Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the 
segmented approach of 
Regina in Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. 
Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 
(1957).” 
Citing 
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1981 
Brunwasser v. 
Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 
518 F. Supp. 
1321, 1324 
(W.D. Pa. 1981) 
“Allen N. Brunwasser’s 
pleadings contain a good 
bit of this, and we are never 
certain whether we are 
reading an attempted 
assertion of a legal claim, 
or some side remark that 
popped into Brunwasser’s 
mind at the time. But more 
than that, Brunwasser’s 
pleadings and briefs reflect 
principally the style of the 
stream of consciousness 
school, so popular in that 
generation. We were able 
to understand dimly the 
action in “Ulysses”, today 
it is explained by shelves of 
guides, commentaries, 
companions and 
concordances. As Joyce 
grew older he became more 
difficult and nobody 
understood “Finnegan’s 
Wake” until the guides and 
commentaries began to 
appear. No one supplies us 
with guides to 
Brunwasser’s pleadings.” 
Critical 
1985 
State v. Helgoth, 
691 S.W.2d 281 
(Missouri 1985) 
Dissent claims that the 
child pornography statute 
was overbroad and the 
majority opinion would 
permit a statute prohibiting 
Ulysses. 
Citing 
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1985 
American 
Booksellers v. 
Hudnut, 771 
F.2d 323 (7th 
Cir. 1985) 
Sarcastically noting that the 
Indianapolis pornography 
ordinance, which banned 
pornography because of 
“explicit subordination of 
women” would have to 
take another look at 
banning works like 
Ulysses, which depicts 
“women as submissive 
objects for conquest and 
domination.” “Those 
opposing the ordinance 
point out that much radical 
feminist literature is 
explicit and depicts women 
in ways forbidden by the 
ordinance and that the 
ordinance would reopen old 
battles. It is unclear how 
Indianapolis would treat 
works from James Joyce’s 
Ulysses to Homer’s Iliad; 
both depict women as 
submissive objects for 
conquest and domination.”  
Citing 
1992 
Marshak v. 
Marshak, 1992 
WL 11168 (D. 
Conn. 1992) 
Quoting Ulysses (“History 
is a nightmare from which I 
am trying to awake”) in 
reference to a plaintiff’s 
tragic history. The quote is 
the first sentence of the 
opinion. 
Other 
304 UMass Law Review v. 11 | 268 
1997 
Cleveland’s PM 
on the 
Boardwalk v. 
Ohio Liquor 
Control 
Commission, 
1997 WL 25522 
(D. Ohio 1997) 
Indicating that state 
obscenity law would ban 
Ulysses and rap songs 
generally. 
Citing 
1999 
Dayton Tavern 
v. Liquor 
Control 
Commission, 
1999 WL 
941826 (Ohio 
App. 1999) 
Cites Ulysses as a work that 
could be banned under an 
overbroad law.  
Citing 
1999 
DRABKOWSKI 
v. CITY OF 
BIDDEFORD, 
1999 Me. Super. 
LEXIS 264, *3 
(Me. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 24, 1999) 
“Adult” materials within 
the meaning of the 
Biddeford ordinance could 
run the gamut from soft-
core pornography to works 
such as James Joyce’s 
Ulysses. 
Citing 
1999 
Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 
1 (1999) 
Noting that James Joyce 
would have been convicted 
for selling Ulysses upon a 
jury using a statewide 
standard for determining 
obscenity. 
Citing 
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2003 
Conchatta v. 
Evanko, 83 Fed. 
App’x 437 (3d 
Cir. 2003) 
Trouble in defining work to 
be penalized under statute, 
such as a reading aloud 
from Ulysses. 
Critical 
2004 
Cline v. Fox, 
319 F. Supp. 2d 
685 (N.D. 
W.Virginia 
2004) 
“The rationality of Policy 
Directive 503.00(V) (P) 
becomes more questionable 
in light of the prison’s 
allowance of commercial 
pornography. Pol’y Dir. 
503.00(III). Consequently, 
the policy permits 
magazines such as Playboy 
or Maxim, which objectify 
women in order to sexually 
arouse or gratify men. 
(LeMasters Depo. at 38.) 
But the policy would 
certainly forbid James 
Joyce’s Ulysses, ostensibly 
because such books ‘create 
an intolerable risk of 
disorder.’” 
Citing 
2005 
Newcom 
Holdings v. 
IMBROS Corp., 
369 F. Supp. 2d 
700 (E.D. 
Virginia 2005) 
“Although drafted by 
counsel, the Deed of 
Rectification is entirely 
lacking in basic clarity. For 
example, there are no dates, 
either in the Deed’s text or 
next to the parties’ 
signatures, to establish 
when the Deed went into 
effect. Some sections, such 
as Section 5, include no 
punctuation, resulting in 
Critical 
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run-on prose more like that 
used by James Joyce in 
Ulysses than the style 
expected from lawyers 
drafting a document meant 
to govern complex business 
dealings.” (Footnote 
omitted.) 
2006 
Piggee v. Carl 
Sandburg 
College, 464 
F.3d 667 (7th 
Cir. 2006) 
“No college or university is 
required to allow a 
chemistry professor to 
devote extensive classroom 
time to the teaching of 
James Joyce’s demanding 
novel Ulysses.” 
Other 
2010 
Couch v. Jabe, 
737 F. Supp. 
561 (D. Virginia 
2010) 
Regulation denying prison 
inmates access to Ulysses 
was found in violation of 
the First Amendment. 
Citing 
2010 
Lease v. Fishel, 
712 F. Supp. 2d 
359, 376 (M.D. 
Pa. 2010) 
“Like some of the works of 
the great Irish literary 
figure, James Joyce, 
aspects of this pleading are 
written in a stream-of-
consciousness style, one 
which presumes that the 
reader has a unique insight 
into the thoughts of the 
writer and can thus give 
meaning to seemingly 
unconnected ideas. In the 
hands of a literary stylist 
like Joyce, this manner of 
expression can be 
challenging; in the hands of 
counsel it is sometimes 
incomprehensible.” 
Critical 
2011 
Reyes v. AT&T, 
801 F. Supp. 2d 
1350 (S.D. Fl. 
2011) 
The “old adage of ‘be 
careful what you wish for’” 
can be traced back before 
Ulysses. Quotes Ulysses: 
Other 
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“That may be too, Stephen 
said. There is a saying of 
Goethe’s which Mr. Magee 
likes to quote. ‘Beware of 
what you wish for in youth 
because you will get it in 
middle life.’”  
2011 
Smith v. Beard, 
26 A.3d 551 
(Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2011) 
“We now turn to the 
assertion that the Policy is 
unconstitutionally 
overbroad. In Cline, relied 
upon by Mr. Smith, the 
prison policy at issue 
prohibited all books, 
magazines, photographs, 
etc. that contained any 
description of sexual 
conduct, but allowed 
commercial pornography 
such as Playboy. Cline, 319 
F.Supp.2d at 693. Thus, the 
policy prohibited books 
such as James Joyce’s 
Ulysses and George 
Orwell’s 1984, but 
permitted Playboy. The 
district court held that such 
a policy was overbroad and 
did not bear a reasonable or 
rational relationship or 
connection to the prison’s 
desired goals, which were 
akin to the Department’s 
rationale for the Policy.” 
Citing 
2011 
Wisconsin 
Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass’n 
v. Gannett Co., 
658 F.3d 614 
(7th Cir. 2011) 
Regarding Ulysses decision 
as one of the “most famous 
free speech decisions in our 
history.” 
Citing 
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2012 
Catholic Health 
Initiatives Iowa 
Corp. v. 
Sebelius, 841 F. 
Supp. 2d 270, 
271 (D.D.C. 
2012)  
Judge Lamberth 
characterizes the U.S. 
Medicare law as akin to “a 
law written by James Joyce 
and edited by E.E. 
Cummings.” 
Critical 
2014 
Eve Cuyen 
Butterworth v. 
281 St. Nicholas 
Partners LLC, 
2014 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 3379, *1 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
July 22, 2014) 
“The Defendants move to 
strike various paragraphs 
and claims in the prolix 
complaint in this matter, 
which consumes 239 
paragraphs and 39 pages 
before its culmination. The 
Hemingway interpretation 
of the complaint (as 
opposed to James Joyce in 
Ulysses), is a landlord and 
tenant dispute involving 
allegations of failing to 
maintain the property as 
required state and 
municipal building 
maintenance codes and/or 
rent stabilization rules.” 
Critical 
2015 
Eng v. Tingen, 
2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5634, *4 
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 
12, 2015) 
“Eng’s appellate brief is a 
stream of consciousness 
narrative that would make 
James Joyce proud. 
Unfortunately for Eng, 
James Joyce is not a good 
model to use in writing an 
appellate brief.” 
 
Critical 
VII. WHY THE SHIFT? 
From 1934 to 1974, there were sixteen cases referencing Joyce for 
the substantive reason that the Ulysses cases are at the foundation of 
free speech law in the context of obscenity prosecutions. In that same 
time period, there were none that mentioned Joyce to criticize his 
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writing. From 1975 on there were fourteen cases referencing Joyce 
substantively and eight for negative stylistic reasons. Did Joyce simply 
fall out of fashion once “Members Only” jackets came into style? If 
we examine 1981 to the present, the comparison is even starker. 
An analysis of the psychological profiles of the affected judges is 
beyond the scope of this work. However, anecdotally, it seems that the 
descent from respect to derision followed political speech into its 
downward spiral of anti-intellectualism. 119  If we examine political 
rhetoric in the United States, we discover that State of the Union 
addresses were written for college graduates during the 19th century, 
but now target Americans with a mere eighth-grade reading level. 120 
In fact, the descent has been constant and rapid. An in-depth study 
shows that the 1934 State of the Union address was delivered at a 15.7 
Flesch-Kincaid level.121 By the time George W. Bush took office, the 
level was a 7.5.122 
Although the descent has been long, on November 4, 1981, 
America elected Ronald Reagan as President, and a long period of 
anti-intellectual rule took hold. 123  From that point forward, 
intellectualism was a political liability. Although the President and the 
judicial branch are separate, the President nominates Supreme Court 
                                                      
 
 
119 See generally ELVIN T. LIM, THE ANTI-INTELLECTUAL PRESIDENCY: THE 
DECLINE OF PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE 
W. BUSH (2008). 
120 Dr. Eric Ostermeyer, “My Message is Simple”: Obama’s SOTU Written at 8th 
Grade Level for Third Straight Year, SMART POLITICS (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://editions.lib.umn.edu/smartpolitics/2012/01/25/my-message-is-simple-
obamas-so/. 
121 Id. The Flesch-Kincaid test assesses written text, with a formula that translates 
the score to a U.S. grade level. Longer sentences with more syllables yield 
higher scores. 
122 See id. 
123 Reagan was apt to tear down the Free Speech movement with his “obey the rules 
or get out” mentality. Steven Hayward, Ronald Regan and the Transformation 
of Modern California, 6 NEXUS: J. OP. 145, 151 (2001). “[W]hile Reagan was in 
real life in awe of intellectuals, ‘Reagan, in the long tradition of populism, 
certainly exploited the anti-intellectual biases of his constituencies.’” LIM, supra 
note 119, at 152 n.37. Reagan also attempted to take down Roe v. Wade. See 
Lawrence G. Sager, Memoirs of a General in the Inglorious Revolution Order 
and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1203, 1214 (1992). 
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justices, the Senate confirms them and all other federal judges, and a 
culture of rejecting intellectuals as proper guardians of democracy was 
fully in place by the time MTV came on the air. It is a reasonable 
hypothesis that the judiciary simply followed the trend, with a calm 
rejection of intellectualism that would no longer tolerate the likes of 
Joyce in its ranks. Coupled with a sharp shift to the right in the 
judiciary, the die was cast: Joyce was no longer in favor. 
IV. THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF JOYCE SCHOLARSHIP TODAY 
Where does that leave us today? With American judges embracing 
anti-intellectualism to the point that few lawyers even remember that 
we owe much of our freedom of expression to James Joyce, is it any 
surprise that the view from the bench is not one that puts Joyce in an 
overwhelmingly positive light? Halfway through its history as a “free 
book,” Ulysses and its author were universally mentioned only in the 
most positive of lights—as positive precedent or as worthy of 
protection. But, since that midway point, we find ourselves looking at 
a very different view from the robed ones. 
The mere fact that there is such a thing as an academic who 
devotes their time to the study of Ulysses is a victory in itself—and as 
much as I think that Anthony Comstock and his ilk should be relegated 
to unkind corners of history books, I must thank them as well: In their 
zeal to ban Ulysses, we found the confrontation we needed in order to 
lay the cornerstone for the edifice that would become modern free 
speech jurisprudence. 
I point out that it is the mere cornerstone. In more modern times, 
we find ourselves confronted with a horde of anti-intellectualism, 
which threatens to push back the liberating tide that came in that day 
in 1934. Further, we have found continued artistic persecution against 
humorists, pornographers, and musicians alike. George Carlin, 124 
                                                      
 
 
124 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Also known as the “Filthy 
Words” or “Seven Dirty Words” case, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
that the FCC served a compelling government interest in protecting children 
from offensive material by prohibiting such broadcasts during certain hours. 
“Shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits!” George Carlin, 
Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television (1972). 
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Lenny Bruce,125 Al Goldstein,126 Larry Flynt,127 and 2 Live Crew128 all 
stood on the ramparts that Ulysses itself originally built. Those 
ramparts are built from the working-class language and brutal honesty 
that sprang from Joyce’s mind. And, although it is not a legal text, 
Ulysses is as important to our concepts of liberty as anything penned 
by any jurist, perhaps with the exception of Holmes’s dissent.129 “We 
need to understand how and why [changes in obscenity law] occurred. 
Reviewing this history is important, too, because it out to make us 
humble about our certainties.”130 Ulysses is not just a gift to literature, 
Ulysses is a gift to freedom—and as such, lyric it was, and lyric it is. 
                                                      
 
 
125 Bruce was arrested on obscenity charges after a 1961 comedy show for using the 
word “cocksucker” and commenting that anyone offended by the sexual use of 
the term “to come” “probably can’t come.” He was arrested on three different 
occasions in 1962 and was eventually sentenced to a year in jail. A long run of 
obscenity, drug, and money laundering cases ended when Bruce was arrested 
after a New York show where undercover officers claimed he used obscene 
language more than 100 times, including “jack me off,” and “nice tits.” In 2003, 
Bruce was granted a gubernatorial pardon from the state of New York. See Doug 
Linder, The Trials of Lenny Bruce, (2003), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/ 
projects/ftrials/bruce/bruceaccount.html. 
126 People v. Heller, 307 N.E.2d 805 (1973) (Goldstein’s conviction for distributing 
obscene materials within his newspaper SCREW was upheld as constitutional 
under the Miller test). 
127 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The First Amendment 
protected a parody piece about Jerry Falwell’s “first time” which appeared in 
Flynt’s Hustler magazine in 1983 when the U.S. Supreme Court held that public 
figures cannot be compensated for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
resulting from protected speech. 
128 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In a unanimous U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” was protected as parody under the First Amendment and copyright 
law. 
129 See, e.g., Hon. George T. Anagnost, Book Review: The Legal Odyssey of Joyce’s 
Ulysses—Review of The Most Dangerous Book, 51 ARIZ. ATT’Y 56 (2015); 
Stephen Gillers, A Tendency to Deprave and Corrupt: The Transformation of 
American Obscenity Law from Hicklin to Ulysses II, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 215 
(2007). 
130 Gillers, supra note 129, at 223. 
